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The Greek Catholic Church and the Scandal of Ruthenian Desertion in Przemyśl, 





The Habsburg Army was, like the empire it served, an extraordinarily complicated institution.  
Multi-ethnicity was its defining characteristic; it was, as its official history proudly stated, ‘an 
army of peoples’.1  While German-speakers were very prominent in the officer corps, the 
army’s rank and file fully reflected the diversity of Emperor Franz Joseph’s lands.  In 1910, 
Germans and Hungarians each composed about a quarter of the army’s establishment.  
Czechs (13 per cent), Serbo-Croats (9 per cent) Poles (8 per cent), Ukrainians (or, as they 
were commonly known at the time, Ruthenes – 7.6 per cent), Romanians (7 per cent), and 
Slovaks, Slovenes and Italians comprised the rest.  Some regiments recognised as many as 
four languages among their personnel.2  During the First World War, and subsequently in 
German- and English-language historiography, the impact of troops’ national identity on 
battlefield performance was much debated.  Czech soldiers’ conduct was subject to especially 
bitter debate and has been scrutinised by historians.3  However, in the conflict’s first year, the 
Austro-Hungarian High Command’s concern and suspicion was directed at least as much, if 
not more, toward Ukrainian-speaking (Ruthenian) civilians and soldiers. 
 
This article examines the issue of Ruthenian desertion during the siege of Przemyśl in 1914-
15, and presents some documentation from the Kriegsarchiv in Vienna.  As most readers of 
this journal will know, the fortress-city of Przemyśl was besieged by the Russian Army from 
mid-September until 10 October 1914 and then again from 4 November until its capitulation 
through hunger on 22 March 1915.  Through the struggle the fortress-city became, in the 
words of one Hungarian journalist, ‘a symbolic point for the Monarchy.  Nearly all the 
nationalities of Austria and Hungary defended it.’4  The fortress was garrisoned by the 23 
                                                          
1 Bundesministerium für Heereswesen und Kriegsarchiv, Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg 1914-1918.  Das 
Kriegsjahr 1914 vom Kriegsausbruch bis zum Ausgang der Schlacht bei Limanowa-Lapanów (7 Vols., Vienna: 
Verlag der Militärwissenschaftlichen Mitteilungen, 1931), i  [hereafter ÖULK, i], p. 54. 
2 N. Stone, ‘Army and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1900-1914’, Past and Present, 33 (1966), 99-100 
3 See, particularly, R. Lein, Pflichterfüllung oder Hochverrat?  Die tschechischen Soldaten Österreich-Ungarns 
im Ersten Weltkrieg (Vienna and Berlin, 2011) and, for a rival view, M. Rauchensteiner, The First World War 
and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy (Vienna, Cologne and Weimar, 2014), pp. 317-54.  
4 R. Molnár, Galicja 1914-1915.  Zapiski korespondenta wojennego, tr. A Engelmayer (Warsaw, 2012), p. 148. 
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Honvéd Division, a formation raised in (what was then) southern Hungary with significant 
numbers of Romanians and Serbs, and four poorly equipped Landsturm Brigades: the 97th 
Hungarian, 108th upper Austrian, 93rd eastern Galician and 111th central Galician Landsturm 
Brigades.  Among the garrison’s sixty-five battalions, nineteen and a half had in their ranks 
some or many Ruthenes.5   
 
The correspondence accompanying this article dates from January 1915 and was initiated by 
the Fortress Commander, General Hermann Kusmanek von Burgneustädten (1860-1934).  
Concerned about rising desertion by Ruthenian troops in his garrison, he sought help from the 
Greek Catholic Bishop of Przemyśl, Konstantyn Czechowicz (1847-1915).  To understand 
the context to his letter, it is necessarily to begin with the national tensions in Galicia and the 
identity divisions among Ruthenians at the beginning of the twentieth century.  The census of 
1910 registered 3,208,092 Ukrainian-speakers in the province.  These people were far from 
united.  The Austrian parliamentary elections of 1907 reflected a division been a majority 
identifying with Ukrainian national parties and a Russophile or ‘Old Ruthenian’ minority 
who conceived of themselves as a branch of the Russian people.  The last years of peace saw 
considerable turbulence in Galicia.  In April 1908, foreshadowing the far more famous 
regicide of June 1914, the Emperor’s representative in the province, Statthalter (Namiestnik) 
Andrzej Potocki, was assassinated by a Ukrainian nationalist student as a protest against 
Polish conservative rule.  Russophile agitation, funded secretly by the Russian government, 
also greatly increased in the province.  The Habsburg military noted with concern the more 
than tenfold increase in prosecutions for spying in the province between 1908 and 1913.6   
 
When war erupted in the summer of 1914, both the Galician civil authorities and the army 
moved against Ruthenian elites of all political persuasions.  Across the land, more than 
10,000 people were imprisoned.  Most were placed in preventative arrest on suspicion of 
Russian sympathies, though very many were Ukrainian nationalists who felt only enmity 
towards the great oppressor to the east.  Przemyśl was caught up in the hysteria.  Greek 
Catholic Clergy, who as intellectuals and opinion-formers were objects of distrust across the 
province, were targeted.  Across Czechowicz’s diocese 314 priests, more than a third of his 
clergy, were interned by the authorities.  Within the city of Przemyśl and its environs, of 
                                                          
5 G.A. Tunstall, Written in Blood.  The Battles for Fortress Przemyśl in WWI (Bloomington and Indianapolis, 
IN, 2016), pp. 29-30 and 35. 
6 K. Bachmann, Ein Herd der Feindschaft gegen Rußland.  Galizien als Krisenherd in den Beziehungen der 
Donaumonarchie mit Rußland (1907-1914) (Vienna and Munich, 2001), pp. 128-38, 196-201 and 232. 
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fifty-five Greek Catholic clergymen twenty-three were interned.7  Ordinary villagers were 
also arrested and harshly punished, often for minor infractions.  The case of Andzej Kużmin 
and Józef Leszczyński, two Greek Catholic tailor apprentices from the village of Kropiwnik 
Nowy (ninety kilometres south-east of Przemyśl, now in Ukraine) illustrates how sensitive 
the authorities were at the war’s opening.  Both men were arrested and imprisoned for 
parodying in public both the imperial hymn and the Mazurek Dąbrowskiego.  Their rowdy 
and improvised version of the latter went as follows: 
 
 Poland is not yet lost 
 Though it will be lost 
 The Pole will have to clean the Ruthenian’s boots 
 And Austria will have to clean the Russian’s arse.8 
 
Imprisonment and internment could be effectively a death sentence: notoriously, in the camp 
at Thalerhof, where 8,000 people, most of them Ruthenians, were incarcerated, poor hygiene, 
epidemics and neglect resulted in the deaths of 1,767 prisoners.9  Many others were killed in 
Galicia by an army made vengeful and more paranoid through early defeat.  A general retreat 
to Przemyśl took place in mid-September.  The lawlessness and violence spreading through 
the province reached the city with the troops.  On the sixteenth of that month, Hungarian 
dragoons massacred forty-four Ruthenian prisoners in broad daylight, among one cavalryman 
claimed to see among the suspected Russophiles peasants who had shot at a patrol.  Firearms, 
sabres and even fence posts were used in the slaughter.  No perpetrator was ever caught.10 
 
In the Fortress Command at Przemyśl, the middle of September was fraught time.  Kusmanek 
and his staff officers not only had to keep order as the broken Field Army withdrew, but were 
preparing for imminent siege.  Under this intense stress, anxiety about disloyalty, which until 
this moment had been focused on civilians, began also to be directed toward Ruthenian 
soldiers.  After reports arrived that Ruthenian troops had performed poorly in the defence of 
the Halicz Bridgehead on the Dniester River, the Fortress Command became concerned that 
the 111th Landsturm Brigade – a local formation with Polish and Ruthenian personnel – was 
                                                          
7 A. Szczupak, Greckokatolicka diecezja Przemyska w latach I wojny światowej (Cracow, 2015), pp. 44 and 55. 
8 Kk Gericht des Festungskommandos in Przemyśl.  Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych: 281: fo. 21-7. 
9 Szczupak, Greckokatolicka, p. 49. 
10 See the documentation pertaining to the massacre in Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv Vienna: Min.d.Innern, 
Präs., 22/Galiz. (1918): Karton 2119: Doc. 21832. 
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garrisoning the girdle forts.  On 16 September, a secret order was issued to post Hungarian 
troops to these forts, with a view to eventually removing the brigade from these crucial 
defensive installations.11  Near simultaneously, hurried measures were taken to evacuate 
6,000 Ruthenian military labourers from the Fortress.  The military telegrams, which initially 
referred to ‘workers of Ruthenian nationality’, revealingly soon seamlessly reverted to a 
discussion of ‘Russophile’ workers, as if these terms were interchangeable.12 
 
A few days later, the Fortress Command’s paranoia ramped up a notch, as attention turned to 
Landsturm Regiment 19, part of the 93rd eastern Galician Landsturm Brigade.  This regiment 
was dramatically labelled ‘dangerous for the fortress.’  Its commander warned that in fighting 
further east, the men had ‘left officers in the lurch and fled’, throwing away their weapons in 
the rush to escape.  In the context of the major disasters besetting the Habsburg Army around 
Lwów, such conduct was neither surprising nor unique; both the 23 Honvéd Infantry Division 
and the 97 Landsturm Brigade, Hungarian units which later served in the Przemyśl garrison, 
succumbed to panic and flight in early September.13  However, for Landsturm Regiment 19, 
senior officers all fixated on the allegedly Russophile sympathies of the communities from 
which the unit was recruited.  The national composition of the unit – around one-third Poles 
and nearly two-thirds Ruthenes – was blamed for its indiscipline.14  In fact, there were clearly 
other factors at play which made this regiment especially vulnerable to collapse.  As its 
commander conceded, the unit suffered from a shortage of officers, and many of those it did 
have were physically unfit.  Its rank and file were ‘too old’ for active service.  Perhaps worst 
of all, their rifle training was ‘equal to zero.’15   
 
The month of October, filled first with intense fighting as the Russians stormed the fortress 
and then with euphoria at relief by the rejuvenated Habsburg Field Army, appears to have put 
fears of Ruthenian disloyalty in the ranks temporarily to rest.  However, from the start of the 
                                                          
11 Secret order to Commanders of IV - VIII Defensive Districts, 16 Sept. 1914.  Kriegsarchiv [hereafter KA] 
Vienna: Neue Feldakten [hereafter NFA]: Festungskmdo Przemysl: Karton 1321: fo. 727. 
12 Telegrams from Fortress Command in Przemyśl and Field Transport Control Krakau, 13 Sept. 1914.  KA 
Vienna: NFA: Festungskmdo Przemysl: Karton 1321: fo. 573 and 641. 
13 For the 97 Landsturm Brigade’s and the 23 Honved Infantry Division’s panic and flight outside Lwów on the 
night of 2 Sept see Bundesministerium für Heereswesen und Kriegsarchiv, Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg, i, 
p. 253. 
14 R. Nowak, ‘Die Klammer des Reiches.  Das Verhalten der elf Nationalitäten Österreich-Ungarns in der k.u.k. 
Wehrmacht 1914 bis 1918’, p. 331.  KA Vienna: NL Nowak B/726/1. 
15 Fortress Command in Przemyśl to 3 Army Command and 44 Infantry Division, 18 Sept. 1914.  KA Vienna: 
NFA: Festungskmdo Przemysl: Karton 1321: fo. 771-2. 
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second siege on 4 November, anxiety again rose due to a trickle of desertions which 
continued into the New Year.  Russian Army propaganda, tailored to play on Ruthenian 
troops’ specific concerns, added fuel to the fire.  For sure, there were lies: the Russian armies 
had already crossed the Carpathian Mountains and were marching on Budapest. Cracow was 
encircled.  Yet the Russians also skilfully exploited the real recent Habsburg brutality in 
order to foster resentment and undermine discipline.  ‘Your villages have been burned by 
Austrian troops, your families abandoned to frost and starvation’, asserted one propaganda 
flyer, entirely truthfully.  ‘They would have starved if we had not given them a warm roof 
and bread. […] The sooner the forts fall, the more we can rescue your unhappy compatriots 
from freezing – from death!  It depends on you!’16 
 
Kusmanek’s appeal to Bishop Czechowicz for help in stopping Ruthenian desertions came 
after six men in the first battalion of Landsturm Infantry Regiment 35 fled for Russian lines 
early on the morning of 6 January.  His claim in the letter that desertion was ‘rife’ in the 
battalion was exaggerated; it had reported seven desertions between 10 November and 3 
December.17  Nevertheless, these defections did pose a security risk and the final case which 
prompted his letter was especially worrying.  Russophilia may have been a motive.  The unit 
was raised in the border district of Brody and, according to their company commander, all the 
deserters came from two communities with known Russian sympathies.  On the other hand, 
the bugler who organised the desertion had a reputation as a reliable soldier and, at three 
months into the second siege, plenty of other reasons existed to wish to leave: cold, hunger 
and the obvious hopelessness of the Fortress’s strategic situation.  What was undeniable and 
shocking was the brazenness of the flight.  The deserters tricked tired frontline sentries in the 
night by passing themselves off as a patrol, and had escaped into no man’s land.18 
 
The Greek Catholic Bishop of Przemyśl, Konstantyn Czechowicz, was at first glance perhaps 
a rather odd figure from whom to seek support.  After all, his clergy had been among the 
greatest victims of the Galician civil authorities’ and Habsburg army’s wartime persecution.  
Nonetheless, Kusmanek’s approach was sensible.  The Catholic Church – both its Roman and 
                                                          
16 Muzeum Narodowe Ziemi Przemyskiej w Przemyślu [hereafter MNZP Przemyśl]: Archiwum Molnera: 
DVD6 – T. nr 23 MP HIST 410: fo. 3-4. 
17 K.u.k. Festungskommando, Op. Nr. 159/5, 5 Jan. 1915.  KA Vienna: NFA: Festungskmdo Przemysl: Karton 
1323: fo.135. 
18 See the reports on the desertion from the 2 Feldkompanie, K.k. Landsturminfanterieregiment No. 35, 6 Jan. 
1915.  KA Vienna: NFA: Festungskmdo Przemysl: Karton 1323: fo. 202-8.  
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Greek branches – was an ideological pillar of the Habsburg Monarchy.  While Franz Joseph’s 
peoples were riven by ethnic division, four-fifths of the population were unified through the 
Catholic faith.19  Czechowicz had no doubt of his loyalties.  First, from both his Church and 
Ukrainian national standpoints, his interests lay with Austria.  As he wrote in his reply, ‘I 
know … that the Russians would respect neither my Catholic faith nor my nationality nor, 
what concerns me personally, my position.’  Hostile Tsarist authorities had dissolved his 
Church in Russia already in 1875.  Since his consecration as bishop in 1897, he had been 
confronted by the rival Russian Orthodox Church’s aggressive proselytising in his diocese.  
The Russian occupation of eastern Galicia in 1914 brought with it the arrest and deportation 
of the Greek Catholic Metropolitan of Lwów, Andrei Sheptits’kyi, an influx of Orthodox 
clergy and attacks on Ukrainian education and culture.20  
 
There is also good reason to believe Czechowicz’s claim to be ‘bound to the holy person of 
his Majesty … not only by sacred oaths, which I have sworn repeatedly but also by the deep 
inner feelings of gratitude, love and stalwart loyalty.’  The bishop had enjoyed the support of 
Austrian authorities in upholding the Greek Catholic faith, and been ennobled and rewarded 
with high honours such as the Order of the Iron Crown.21  His conduct during the visit of 
Karl, the future Emperor, to Przemyśl at the end of October 1914 offers insight into his mind-
set, and particularly his deep concern (as in his letter to Kusmanek) to emphasise Ruthenians’ 
loyalty to the Monarchy.  The ‘old Ruthenian bishop’, wrote Karl, ‘explained to me with tears 
that he feared that His Majesty could believe of his loyal people of the Ruthenians, that it was 
unpatriotic.  He pleaded that one should execute the bad elements – they deserved nothing 
more – but the real Ruthenians were true to the Kaiser till their last breath.’22 
 
The Bishop’s response to Kusmanek’s request was to organise a series of special sermons and 
services between 13-16 and 20-23 January.  His efforts were given added urgency by another 
group desertion from the first battalion, Landsturm Infantry Regiment 35 on the night of 13-
                                                          
19 See P. Houlihan, Catholicism and the Great War.  Religion and Everyday Life in Germany and Austria-
Hungary, 1914-1922 (Cambridge, 2015), pp. 21-9. 
20 M. von Hagen, War in a European Borderland.  Occupations and Occupation Plans in Galicia and Ukraine, 
1914-1918 (Seattle, WA, 2007), pp. 19-45. 
21 For a full discussion of Czechowicz and his pre-war struggle against Russian Orthodoxy, see Szczupak, 
Greckokatolicka diecezja Przemyska, pp. 16-40. 
22 From the ‘Kriegserinnerungen Kaiser Karls – Kriegsjahr 1914 o.O., 1914 Oktober 13 – Dezember 24’, 
reproduced in E. Kovács, P. Arato, F. Pichorner and L. Wewalka (eds.), Untergang oder Rettung der 
Donaumonarchie?  Politische Dokuments zu Kaiser und König Karl I. (IV.) aus internationalen Archiven (2 
vols., Vienna, Cologne and Weimar, 2004), ii, p. 85.  
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14 January.  A corporal and nine men had disappeared from a field watch.23  The Bishop’s 
first sermons on the thirteenth and fifteenth were given to this Landsturm Regiment.  The first 
day’s session was held in Przemyśl city centre.  To reach all its soldiers, the Bishop then 
travelled on the fifteenth to the camp at Żurawica, in the north of the girdle.  Subsequent 
masses and sermons were targeted at other units with Ruthenian personnel.  The Bishop 
spoke to the Third Battalion of Major General Nickl’s Group on the sixteenth, Landwehr 
Infantry Regiment 19 on the twentieth and, on the final two days, to soldiers from a variety of 
units, including Landsturm Infantry Regiment 33.24  As well as urging the men to remember 
their oath to Austria’s monarch, Czechowicz particularly stressed the oppressive nature of 
Russia.  The empire to the east, he warned, was ‘the prison of unfree nations.’  The Tsars 
‘never kept promises to subordinated peoples.’25   
 
Whether the Bishop’s sermons stiffened Ruthenians’ willingness to hold out is debateable.  
Unquestionably, desertions continued.  In early February, for example, Landwehr Regiment 
19 suffered a spate of desertions from field watches despite having been one of the units 
sermonised by the bishop.26  Landsturm Infantry Regiment 33, another targeted unit, 
similarly lost a field watch in early March, which went over wholesale to the Russians.27 
Kusmanek had threatened ‘strict military measures’ in his letter to Czechowicz if there was 
more desertion and the following month these were implemented.  The Fortress had already 
executed men for absconding.28  The new measures amplified the deterrent effect of the 
punishment.  Soldiers were to be warned that deserters’ home communities would be 
telegrammed so that their ‘cowardice’ could be made publicly known.  Not only they, but 
also their relatives would be made to suffer.  All state support would be withdrawn from their 
parents and wives.  In the hope of preventing further cases, officers were warned to keep a 
                                                          
23 Report by Company C.O. and interviews with sentries of 5. Kompanie, K.k. Landsturminfanterieregiment Nr. 
35, 15 Jan. 1915.  KA Vienna: NFA: Festungskmdo Przemysl: Karton 1323: fo. 410-12 and 415. 
24 ‘Programm für die Predigten Sein Exzellenz des griechisch-kath. Bischofs’.  KA Vienna: NFA: 
Festungskmdo Przemysl: Karton 1323: fo. 413-4. 
25 Additions to the Bishop’s notes by Reverend Aleksander Zubrycki, quoted in Szczupak, Greckokatolicka 
diecezja Przemyska, p. 97. 
26 IV Defence District Command, ‘Bezirkskommandobefehl’, 15 Feb. 1915.  MNZP Przemyśl: Archiwum 
Molnera: DVD 12: T.nr 7 MP. HIST 394, fo. 61a. 
27 J. Vit, Wspomnienia z mojego pobytu w Przemyślu podczas rosyjskiego oblężenia 1914-1915, trans. L. 
Hofbauer and J. Husar (Przemyśl, 1995), pp. 79-80. 
28 See the vivid descriptions of such executions in J. Gayczak (ed.), Pamiętnik Oberleutnanta Stanisława 
Marcelego Gayczaka (Przemyśl, n.d.), pp. 26-7 and 39-40 (diary entries for 18 Nov. and 22 Dec. 1914). 
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close eye on their men’s mood, to watch out for conspiracies to desert and to report any 
special agitation among their soldiers to the Fortress Command.29 
 
The mounting numbers of Ruthenian soldiers absconding from the fortress in the siege’s last 
months do not necessarily show Bishop Czechowicz’s intervention to have been worthless; 
without it, the numbers of men fleeing may have been still greater.  However, the Fortress 
Command’s focus on national disloyalty as the root cause of the disciplinary problems does 
appear unhelpful.  First, desertion was hardly an exclusively Ruthenian problem; even the 
much vaunted Hungarians also suffered cases.30  Second, it distracted from the dire material 
conditions faced by the garrison.  By mid-January 1915, ration allowances for bread and 
vegetables had halved since the start of the siege.  Troops’ meat consumption had remained 
steady, but only because beef was replaced by horsemeat made available through the 
slaughter of the garrison’s own horses.  What men needed was therefore less spiritual than 
calorific sustenance.31   
 
To close observers of Ruthenian troops, it was primarily these shortages of basic necessities, 
both food and also clothing, and not treasonous ideology, which provided the main motor for 
desertion.  The calamitous circumstances of service were described well by one Hungarian 
officer who visited positions where, he wrote Ruthenians were surrendering ‘en masse as a 
result of poor rations and especially as a result of lack of clothing – none of them had boots.’  
The men were standing ‘in more than half a metre of water and cannot even lie down.  They 
sleep crouched.’32  Similarly, an officer of the 18 Landsturm Infantry Regiment explained the 
desertions by Ruthenians in strictly material terms: they ‘didn’t like the starvation in the 
fortress.’  Notably, however, he did draw an implicit distinction between his regiment’s 
Ukrainian-speakers and its Poles.  Despite the men’s rations being identical, Ruthenians were 
                                                          
29 Festungskommando, ‘Massnahmen gegen Desertion’ Op. Nr. 188/10, 6 Feb. 1915.  MNZP Przemyśl: 
Archiwum Molnera: DVD 7: T.nr 11 MP. HIST 398, fo. 18. 
30 Company Commander of 1 Kompanie, kon. ung. 16/II Honvéd Marchbaon, report on the desertion of five 
men, 14 Jan. 1915.  KA Vienna: NFA: Festungskmdo Przemysl: Karton 1323: fo. 416-17.  
31 Comparison of fortress rations at the outset of the siege and 8 Jan. 1915 in ‘Beilage zum Fskmdobefehl Nr. 
282’, 7 Nov. 1914 and ‘Festungskommandobefehl Nr 12’, 7 Jan. 1915.  KA Vienna: NFA: Festungskmdo 
Przemysl: Karton: 1321: fo. 100 and Karton 1323: fo. 188.  On the earlier date, troops were entitled to 700 
grams of bread, 300 grams of meat and (on 6 days in the week) 200 grams of vegetables.  These allowances 
were reduced to 350 grams of bread and 100 grams of biscuit, 300 grams of horsemeat and 90 grams of 
vegetables (on six days of the week, on the final day 120 grams was allowed). 
32 Diary of an unknown Hungarian officer, 14 Jan. 1915, in I. Lagzi (ed.), Węgrzy w Twierdzy Przemyskiej w 
latach 1914-1915 (Warsaw and Przemyśl, 1985), p. 141. 
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seen as the primary security risk.  The unit was therefore careful to pair up men so that 









One prisoner, Landsturm Artillerist Roshanki – a Ruthenian primary school teacher in civil 
life, told his captors at the end of September that in Przemyśl ‘great mistrust rules toward 
Russian [Ruthenian is meant] soldiers and inhabitants.  A large number of Ruthenes had been 
shot for trivialities.  Such executions take place daily in the fortress; in order to escape this 






Ultimately, Kusmanek did introduce new measures to try to stem group desertion.  Emphasis 
was placed on officers’ care of their men.  ‘I demand’, wrote Kusmanek, ‘that the officers 
minister to the men to a greater degree than till now, and concern themselves at every 
opportunity for the welfare of the rank and file under them.  Especially the composition, the 
preparation and distribution of food is to be given particular attention.’35 
  
The exchange took place at the beginning of January 1915; a difficult time for the Fortress.  
Przemyśl’s stocks of food were running low.  The Habsburg Field Army had briefly liberated 
the fortress-city in October, and had proceeded to consume much of its supplies.  When this 
correspondence took place, the garrison had just completed the slaughter of 8,000 of its own 
                                                          
33 Vit, Wspomnienia, pp. 79-80. 
34 Interrogation of prisoner, Landsturm Artillerist Roshanski, c. 28 Sept. 1914.  KA Vienna: NL Kusmanek: 
B/1137/15. 
35 Festungskommando, ‘Massnahmen gegen Desertion’ Op. Nr. 188/10, 6 Feb. 1915.  Muzeum Narodowe Ziemi 
Przemyskiej w Przemyślu: Archiwum Molnera: DVD 7: T.nr 11 MP. HIST 398, Image 18. 
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horses for food, in order to prolong its resistance.  Morale was also depressed because a 
break-out attempt conducted in late December – the best chance the fortress had of liberation 
during the second siege – had failed with heavy losses.36  The correspondence reflects 




Kusmanek was a native of Transylvania, then in Hungary.  He became an officer in the 
Habsburg Army in 1879 and over a long career served as a brigade commander, divisional 





1.) Draft letter from Fortress Commander Kusmanek to Greek Catholic Bishop 
Czechowicz38: 
 
K.u.k. Fortress Command in Przemyśl  
 
In the 1[st Battalion], Landsturm I[nfantry] R[egiment] 35 desertion is becoming rife.  The 
men do not stand firm in battle and desert to the enemy. 
 
7th January 1915 
 
  Your Excellency! 
 Regrettably, events have shown that the troops of Ruthenian nationality in the 
Fortress – in contrast to the others – not respecting the sacredness of the oath they have 
sworn, perpetrate actions which are to be deeply deplored and which are concerning for the 
defence of the Fortress. 
                                                          
36 Ibid., pp. 102-3, 177-81.  Also, F. Forstner, Przemyśl.  Österreich-Ungarns bedeutendste Festung 2nd edn. 
(Vienna, 1987, 1997), pp. 197, 200 and 216. 
37 R. Kiszling, ‘Hermann Kusmanek von Burgneustädten’, in Österreichisches Biographisches Lexikon 1815-
1950, accessed at http://www.biographien.ac.at/oebl?frames=yes on 28 March 2018.  
38 KA Vienna: NFA: Festungskmdo Przemysl: Karton 1323: fo. 133 and 137.  Both Kusmanek’s letter and 
Czechowicz’s reply are in the German language. 
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 Thus, unfortunately, within the designated unit desertions to the enemy have 
frequently occurred.  The men have also proven themselves unreliable in battle, either not 
standing firm or surrendering themselves to the enemy. 
 Even though the officers have sought to manage this distressing phenomenon, and 
although too the Fortress chaplaincy has left no stone unturned in order to exert religious 
influence on the seemingly stirred up and malevolently advised rank and file, unfortunately 
there has been no success. 
 As, however, through this the security of the Fortress appears threatened, I shall not 
fail to order whatever military measures are necessary. 
 Nonetheless, before I introduce strict military measures, I want to leave no means 
untried that could result here in change. 
 For this reason, I am turning to Your Excellency with the request to support me in my 
efforts. 
 Words which come from the lips of a so high church dignitary will for sure produce a 
more lasting impact on the men of Ruthenian nationality than words of subordinate clergy. 
 I write this in the belief that I can rely on the loyal disposition that Your Excellency 
has so often emphasised and on Your Excellency’s high priestly wisdom. 
 Convinced that Your Excellency will be inclined to support me in my efforts, I request 
– especially with consideration of the urgency of the matter – a reply as soon as is possible. 
 I would then send my General Staff Chief to Your Excellency for the purpose of 
agreeing more detailed, concrete arrangements. 
 Your Excellency, permit me to express my greatest respect, from most sincerely 
  
          ... 
 
2.) Czechowicz’s reply to Kusmanek’s message, which arrived at Fortress Command on 
the next day39: 
 




                                                          
39 Ibid., fo. 213. 
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  Your Excellency! 
 
The much valued message from Your Excellency of the seventh of the current month, 
ref.: Op. 159/5 about the conduct of the troops of Ruthenian nationality within the Fortress 
saddened me greatly.  All the more so, for in this regard I was of an entirely different 
conviction. 
 In consequence of the fact that the majority of the Greek Catholic clergy have left 
Przemyśl, and that apart from myself only five canons and two young priests have stayed, for 
months I have been obliged, despite the bad weather, to read the daily Holy Mass not in my 
private chapel but in the Cathedral.  Otherwise, there would have been too few Holy Masses 
for the churchgoers and for those, mostly soldiers, coming to Communion.  I also sit every 
day in the Confessional Box, as the remaining few clergy could scarcely cope with this work.  
Both I and the other clergy hearing confessions never neglect to instruct the confessing 
soldiers about the sanctity of their military oath and their duties towards His Majesty, the 
Supreme War Commander and Father of the People, and towards the Fatherland. 
 We have the impression that the soldiers of Ruthenian nationality take their duty very 
seriously and want to discharge it with the fullest devotion. 
 Similarly in the sermons at which soldiers are present, influence is exercised in the 
same sense.  I preach myself from time to time – the last time was yesterday – and every time 
I also call upon the soldiers to be mindful of their oath und to do their duty. 
 The safety of the Fortress, the defeat of the enemy is for me a vital issue.  First, I am 
bound to the holy person of his Majesty, our all merciful Father of the People not only by 
sacred oaths, which I have sworn repeatedly but also by the deep inner feelings of gratitude, 
love and stalwart loyalty.  I know too that the Russians would respect neither my Catholic 
faith nor my nationality nor, what concerns me personally, my position.  And these same 
feelings fill also the hearts of the Ruthenian people, despite the Russophile exceptions. 
 Whatever is in my power, whatever I am in a position to do in order to support the 
efforts of Your Excellency, I am always ready with all my heart to do.  I await Your 
Excellency’s wishes and propositions in this matter. 
 Permit me to express the greatest respect toward Your Excellency 
 
      Sincerely, 
 
      + Konstantin Czechowicz 
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      Greek Catholic Bishop. 
 
 
